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Abstract
Leadership is progressively being recognized as a key factor in supporting successful performance across a range of domains. 
This is particularly important when considered within the context of safety, with the now widespread acceptance that safety is an 
emergent property of overall work systems. As such, the decisions and actions that characterize safety leadership thus become 
important emergent properties in the prevention of incidents, which should be considered within the context of the broader 
organizational system and not merely constrained to understanding events or conditions that shape performance at the ‘sharp 
end’. This paper presents a first-of-its-kind test application of a methodological approach, underpinned by systems thinking, to 
the examination of safety leadership. A case study incidentis examined using the Critical Decision Method, Rasmussen’s Risk 
Management Framework and correspondingAccimap method to identify safety leadership decisions and actions, and their 
contribution to the incidents important safe outcome (no injuries or fatalities were incurred). The merits of the methodological 
approach utilized are discussed.
© 2015 The Authors.Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference.
Keywords:Safety leadership; Systems-thinking; Accimap; Critical Decision Method; Rasmussen’s Risk Management Framework
*Corresponding author.Tel.: +61 3 9905 1913; fax: +61 3 9905 4364. 
E-mail address: sarah-louise.donovan@monash.edu
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference
6645 Sarah-Louise Donovan et al. /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  6644 – 6651 
1. Introduction
Leadership is progressively being recognized as a key factor in supporting successful performance across a range 
of domains. Defined as ‘the action of leading a group of people or an organization’ [1], the characteristics that 
underlie different approaches to leadership manifest as both broad and varied. As such, understanding the influence 
leadership has on performance becomes particularly important when considered within the context of safety.
Over the two decades, a body of literature has emerged with a focus on examining the impact leadership has on
safety performance and outcomes within high-risk industries, with support growing for a positive contribution inthe 
prevention of accidents and injuries [2, 3]. Within this, identifying and characterizing the specific influence safety 
leadership plays in the prevention or minimization of accidents offers some important opportunities for enhancement 
of traditional approaches to safety and risk management within high-risk industries.
A review of theliterature regarding safety leadership[4]revealed that much of the research to date has been 
applied within the manufacturing, construction and chemical industries[5-9],with a focus on examining the impact 
of leadership predominantly at the ‘sharp-end’ (i.e., at the frontline supervisory level). The review also showed that 
currently favored methodological approaches have tended to adopt single-level, one-directional data capture 
techniques, mainly involvingthe use of questionnaires and surveys [6, 10-14]. This approachis limited in that it 
restricts not only examination of safety leadership with regard to more distal system elements (e.g., company, 
regulatory and government influences),it furthermore restrictsthe exploration of different leadership behaviors at 
different levels within an organizational system and their relative influence; an important emerging piece of the 
performance puzzle [15, 16].With the now widespread acknowledgement that safety is an emergent property of 
multi-level work systems [17, 18], the decisionsand actions that characterize safety leadership thus become 
important emergent properties in the prevention of incidents and accidents. As such, theirshould be considered 
within the context of the broader organizational system and not merely constrained to examining events and 
conditions that shape performance at the sharp end. Only then can we begin to understand and characterize the true 
contribution of safety leadership in the prevention of incidents and accidents within high-risk industries.
Methodologically,the examination of safety leadership requires a new perspective. This paper discusses the value
of applying systems-based methods to the examination of safety leadership. In a first-of-its-kind approach, a recent 
incident is analyzed through the application of the Critical Decision Method interview technique[19], Rasmussen’s 
Risk Management Framework and Accimap[18]incident analysis methodto identify leadership decisions and actions 
that contributed to the important safety outcome in which no injuries or fatalities were incurred. The findings 
provide support for applying systems-based methods to the examination of safety leadership. 
1.1. The systems approach
Over the past twenty years, the use of systems-based approacheshave become popular for examining safety 
within complex socio-technical systems, and in doing so haveprovided an important step forward for the safety 
science literature[17, 18, 20, 21]. The systems approach assertsthat safety is an emergent property, which is 
influenced by the interactions of actors and elements across every level of an organizational system [17]. As such, 
safety is viewed as a ‘control problem’ [22] with sub-optimal performance usually caused by multiple linked 
contributing factors across different system levels; not just a single catastrophic decision or action at one level alone. 
The systems approach therefore argues it is important to examine and understand the relationships that exist between 
different elements across different levels of an organizational system.
Rasmussen’s Risk Management Framework (RMF) [18] (Figure 1) is a prominent systems-theory based model 
for describing work systems comprised of various levels, and argues that safety is impacted by the decisionsand 
actions of individuals across all levels (e.g., politicians, chief executives, managers, supervisors), not just by those of 
front line operators alone [23]. 
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Fig.1. Rasmussen’s Risk Management Framework.
Each level in the framework is considered connected by the flow of information, with decisions promulgated 
downward for example, as regulations and policies, while information about the current system status is propagated 
upwards to help inform decision-making and action at higher levels [18]. This flow and exchange, known as 
‘vertical integration’, is recognized as essential for safety as it helps to exercise control over hazardous processes to 
ensure safety is maintained [18]. 
Underpinned by the framework, the Accimap method [18] provides an approach through which to describe the 
elements and interactions within and across an organizational system with regard to their contribution and 
connectedness to an incident outcome. While the framework and method are commonly applied to examine 
incidents from the point of view of ‘what went wrong’, both the method and framework are sufficiently flexible and 
adaptable to enable exploration of accident sequences across a range of different contexts [24-27]. In doing so, both 
the framework and method are considered equally applicable to allow description and examination of incidents in 
terms of ‘what went right’. Indeed, Trotter et al.[28] recently applied Accimap to examine the factors enabling a 
successful outcome during the Apollo 13 lunar landing.As such, Rasmussen’s Risk Management Framework and 
Accimap method offer both a useful structure and theoretical basis to be tested in a ‘positive’ sense;that is, to 
demonstrate the application of systems-thinking approaches to examinethe positive contribution of safety leadership
in the prevention and minimization of incidents and accidents. Understanding events that had a positive outcome, 
particularly non-routine and emergency situations represents a critical line of inquiry for safety science generally 
[29, 30].
1.2. Case study analysis
On April 10th2013, a mining company in the U.S. experienced a significant landslide along a fault line of its north 
eastern wall. Dislodging more than 150 million tons of earth, the landslide is recognized as the largest of its type in 
history. 
In the months leading up to the incident, the mining company had identified increasing ground movement on the 
north eastern wall, and had put in place measures to manage the safety risks associated with a potential landslide. 
These measures included relocating people, facilities and key infrastructure. Leading up to, and at the time of the 
slide, multiple layers of protection were in place that afforded considerable advanced warningto ensure operations 
were ceased and all personnel were evacuated well ahead of the landslide. With these layers of protection in place, 
the organization successfully stopped operations and evacuated all personnel from the Mine prior to the 
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landslide,ensuring that no injuries or fatalities occurred as a result of the incident.Figure 2 below provides an 
overview of the incident timeline. The timeline presented runs from the point at which an increased rate of slope
movement was identified until the point at which the north eastern wall failed.
2. Method
The case study was undertaken to explore the safety leadership decisions and actions evident throughout the 
landslide incident. Two methods, the Critical Decision Method (CDM) and Accimap, were used to gather and 
analyze data regarding safety leadership decisions and actions as they emerged within the context of the incident. 
CDM interviews [19] were held with eight participants across five leadership levels within the organizational system 
of interest. CDM is a semi-structured cognitive task analysis technique that is used to examine decision making and 
the associated influencing factors.The CDM interviews were conducted by a Human Factors researcher with 
experience in the application of the technique across different safety critical industries. A standard set of probes 
were used [31], in conjunction with supplementary items to extract additional information on influencing factors 
across different system levels. Each interview was audio taped and lasted for approximately two hours.The data for 
each participant was transcribed and coded into influencing and contributory factors [32]consistent with the six 
levels of Rasmussen’s RMF [18]. 
An Accimap was then constructed from the data to describethe evolution of the incident and map the safety 
leadership decisions and actions enacted by leaders, across various system levels,over the course of the incident. The 
resulting Accimap was reviewed by two Human Factors researchers with considerable experience in the application 
of accident analysis methods, in addition to three Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the organization who were 
familiar with the incident. Any discrepancies or disagreements were resolved through discussion between the 
researchers and the SMEs until consensus was reached. Last, the final Accimapoutput wasreviewed against the 
formal incident investigation reportto determine commonality in the elements and contributing factors identified to
furthersupport validation of the methodological approach used.
3. Results
3.1. Critical Decision Method
From the CDM data, sixteen key decision points were identified and spanned the incident timeline, with the 
CDM probes(extract provided in Table 1) allowing exploration of the specific cues that assisted and supported each 
decision. 
Fig.2. Incident timeline adapted from CDM interview data.
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Table 1.Critical Decision Method interview probes.
Cue Probe
Goal Specification What were your specific goals and objectives at the time?
Cue Identification What features were you looking for when you formulated your decision?
How did you know that you needed to make the decision?
Were there others involved in making the decision?
Conceptual Are there any situations in which your decision would have turned out differently? 
What would have changed the outcome of your decision?
Influence of uncertainty At any stage, were you uncertain about the reliability or the relevance of the information you had 
available?
Information integration What was the most important piece of information you used to formulate the decision?
Situation Awareness What information did you use in making this decision and how was it obtained?
Where was information was being sourced? How timely and by what means it was being shared?
Options What other courses of action/ alternatives were considered or were available?
Decision making How much time pressure was involved in making this decision? How long did it take to actually 
make this decision?
External influences Did you at any time feel like the decisions and actions you were making were constrained 
by:standards/ rules/ procedures, higher organizational influences, Regulation (OSHA/ MSHA),
Government considerations.
The analysis revealed each of the safety leadership decisions and actions identified was underpinned by a range 
of cues with the accuracy of information being provided (influence of uncertainty), the importance of information 
being shared (information integration) and ensuring the safety of personnel was maintained at all times emerging as 
a key goal (goal specification). As such, the communication and sharing of accurate information became important
in influencing and supporting each safety leadership decision throughout the evolution of the incident. Furthermore, 
of the sixteen key decisions identified, 75% demonstrated direct connectedness with at least one other key decision, 
with the remaining decisions providing secondary support and informing through the execution of processes and or 
supporting activities.
3.2. The Accimapmethod
The Accimap analysis revealed the sixteen key safety leadership decisions identifiedthrough the CDM interviews 
spanned across four system levels; Physical actor and process activities, Management, Company and Regulatory 
bodies and external stakeholders. Of the decisions identified, over half (56%) occurred at the Management level, and 
demonstrated connectedness to at least 3 influencing factors and elements, which also spanned across multiple 
system levels (physical processes and actor activities, and equipment and surroundings). The safety leadership 
decisions identified at the Company level were connected to lower level system elements through communications 
based interactions, and focused on providing support and coaching to leaders and decisions executed at these lower 
system levels. The flow and exchange of information across different system levels was evident throughout the 
incident, exhibiting vertical integration.
While the analysis did not reveal any key safety leadership decisions at the highest system level (government) or 
the lowest system level (equipment and surroundings), this is not considered unusual as potential governmental 
influences may have not been apparent or known to the study participants, while the lowest system level elements 
were predominantly related to specific systems and equipment, rather than individuals. 
Figure 3provides an extract of the Accimap analysis and highlights some of the key safety leadership decisions
identified through the CDM interviews that occurred during the initial stages of the incident. Importantly, the 
Accimap analysis demonstrates key decisions were made and executed across multiple system levels. Common 
elementsidentified between the CDM interview data and investigation report are noted. Considerable agreement is 
evident between the findings of the present analysis and the investigation findings, thus providing support and 
validation for the utility of the methodological approach used.  
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Fig.3. Extract of Accimap Analysis of Initial Stages of the Incident.
4. Discussion
The results of this study provide support for the value of applying systems-based methods to the examination of 
safety leadership.
The CDM interview technique was found to be a fitting method to allow identification and exploration of 
elements that contributed to key the safety leadership decisions and actions for each participant. Using the 
technique, key decisions were identified across different leader levels within the organization, with their 
contribution and connectedness able to be traced in terms of supporting the ultimately positive safety outcome. The 
use of the method in this way (i.e., to interview multiple leaders across multiple levels within an organization) 
allowed a level of insight and detail to be gained into important safety leadership decisions and actions that could 
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not have been possible had traditional approaches (i.e., conventional survey methods or exploration of the 
investigation report alone) been used. Furthermore, use of the technique in this way demonstrated support for the 
application of the method in identifying and exploring safety leadership as a positive contributor to the ultimate
safety outcome.
The Accimap method was also found to be afittingmethod to examine safety leadership decisions and actions 
within the incident. The method allowed the safety leadership elements extracted from the CDM interview data to be 
mapped according to their connectedness across multiple system levels, which allowed exploration of the 
interrelationships between elements across different levels. This provided important insight into the closeness and 
distance of specific factors and their influence and contribution to the safety outcome. For example, the early 
decision to notify the Mine leadership team of the increased ground movement was supported by information 
provided by lower system levels, which included individual actions and the timely provision of important system 
generated data. This decision was connected to the secondary decision to escalate and communicate the situation to 
higher levels within the organizational system, both of which were linked to the positive safety outcome of the 
incident in that they triggered the development of appropriate planning and response activities aimed at ensuring 
safety was maintained. Had, for example, the initial notification and escalation occurred later than they did, or had 
they not occurred at all, planning and response activities initiated at lower system levels may not have been afforded 
important resource and support elements (for example; forming of dedicated technical team, engagement of internal 
and external SMEs) which ultimately assisted in developing the response plans and activities which supported the 
safe outcome. 
These findings provide support for the value in applying Accimap to examine safety leadership.The method 
allowed mapping of the interrelationships between elements which spanned multiple system levels, all of which 
contributed to the incidents safe outcome. Furthermore, within each safety leadership element identified, 
communication and information sharing was shown to play a vital role in supporting performance, demonstrating 
vertical integration across multiple system levels which further contributed to the safe outcome of the incident. 
As such, the methodological approach applied provides support for the application of systems-based methodsto 
the examination of safety leadership.It is suggested that future research agendas interested in examining safety 
leadership would benefit from includingsystems-based methods to support data capture and analysis activities.
5. Conclusion
The results of the analysis presented demonstrate the value in applying systems-based methods to the 
examination of safety leadership. The analysis shows the usefulness of the CDM interview technique for extracting
and exploring safety leadership decisionsand actions within the context of an incident, across multiple leader levels. 
In line with this, Rasmussen’s RMF and corresponding Accimap method facilitated visual mapping of the elements 
identified, illustratingthe interrelations between safety leadership decisions and actions and the role these elements 
played in ensuring the positive safety outcome. Furthermore, the Accimap constructed from the CDM interview data 
demonstrated a high degree of concurrence with elements identified within the investigation report, providing 
further support for the validity of the methodological approach used.
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